Introduction
A man is stupid or blind or unintelligent-lacking in mind-just in the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is about, namely, the probable consequence of his acts. 1 This sentence from John Dewey's Democracy and Education (1916/1966) highlights his effort in building a theory of intelligence which he saw as critical to a democratic society. In his later work, A Common Faith (1934), Dewey claimed that "there is but one sure road of access to truth-the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection."
2 These claims, almost two decades apart, are illustrative of Dewey's lifelong faith in cooperative social intelligence to solve the problems that emerge in human experience. Dewey emphasizes the degree to which human activities cannot be adequately understood as an individual's isolated efforts: "Conduct is always shared … It is social, whether bad or good." 3 This conception of intelligence appears to require a purpose to guide action and thus make it intelligent: intelligence is the effective connection between the individual and his environment, between the present circumstance and future goals. But what happens when the gap between previous experience and current experience is so wide that the principle of continuity implicit in purposefulness is stretched beyond the breaking point? Such a condition might be experienced as a void in intelligibility since the inability to frame viable purposes in a context of rapid and profound change short circuits the connection between present circumstance and future purpose which constitutes intelligence. Such conditions would seem to define a paralysis of intelligence, in a Deweyan sense, at the very moment when intelligence is most needed. What then?
This predicament is dramatized in a recent popular Chinese TV series, Storm Troops (2007), which explores the rupture of continuity in a rapidly changing contemporary Chinese society. 4 The lead character, Xu Sanduo, was born into an extremely poor family in a remote village and recruited into the Army when he is 19 years old. Xu is honored by his opportunity to join the Army and makes his greatest effort to perform well in training. However, the gap between his rural experience and his current induction into the social organization of a rapidly modernizing Chinese military is so wide that he "does not know what he is about." His answer to any question is a timid "I don't know." In Dewey's words, he seems to be "lacking in mind." His superiors and fellow soldiers deem him too stupid to be a qualified soldier. After training, he is assigned to guard a site so remote and so valueless that it seems to be the most pointless position in the whole army. Because no one comes to supervise them-to define purpose for them-his fellow soldiers kill time by playing cards, also playing with this seemingly hopeless situation and forgotten land they guard.
Though Xu does not know what he should do, he refuses to kill time like his comrades. The only thing he is sure of is that he should do meaningful things. So, he builds a road. But in this setting, the road itself is purposeless; it goes nowhere since no one will come to use the road. However, even though the road may be meaningless at this point, building the road as an activity is meaningful for Xu. He creates meaning in his life through the action of building a road, even though it is not clear to him why he builds it, other than the vague feeling that he is supposed to be doing something meaningful.
"He does not know what he is about;" he is just busy being about it. He appears to be, then, by Dewey's measure, "stupid or blind or unintelligent," and as a consequence suffers his peers' scorn, discrimination and isolation. 5 In the end, his deed is recognized by the head of the Army and he is promoted to a more important position, becoming not only a qualified but a distinguished soldier. Xu's road building was apparently purposeless in others' eyes. Its shared purposefulness was only discovered later. However, it may be too bold to claim that Xu is purposeless in building the road. To him, the purpose is to create some meaning for his life in this seemingly valueless place. But his own purpose is not shared and recognized by his peers in the beginning. Though in the beginning he did not-or could not-communicate his own purpose so others can recognize it, it does not mean that he does not have a purpose in it. The question is, then, what is it that sustains Xu through this period of isolation when his own purpose is not recognized and shared with others. If Xu does not know "what he is about" in this period, what, then, carries Xu across this void in intelligibility?
We see this story as illustrative of individual experience within the context of rapid social change in which continuity of purpose is not easy to attain. In such a context, we argue, Dewey's conception of intelligence is necessary but not sufficient. We agree that intelligent purpose is developed in shared experience, as Dewey suggests. But we also argue that in the process of developing intelligence, we may have experiences which are unshared and temporarily not communicable. In the case of Xu, his purpose in building a road is not shared and communicable in the beginning. It only becomes a shared experience after he finishes the road building. It seems problematic to use Dewey's conception of intelligence to describe Xu's actions in this story. If this is true then, what supports Xu through this isolated and uncommunicative experience and leads him ultimately to a shared and communicable experience? What is the role of this uncommunicated experience in developing a genuine individuality? Xu's case may offer a new perspective from which to reconsider the sufficiency of Dewey's conception of intelligence in the context of rapid social change.
We will argue that Dewey's conception of intelligence is necessary but not sufficient in negotiating rapid and profound social change because we may experience, in such circumstances, some temporarily isolated experience of our own unshared purposes in this process. This element of experience in such circumstances is not adequately addressed in Dewey's conception of intelligence. Without considering this aspect of experience, Dewey may miss a critical element of experience by emphasizing the social aspect of intelligence and experience. Through the story of Xu, we suggest that this temporarily unshared purpose plays an important role in negotiating rapid and profound social change. Thus, it is worthwhile to ask what sustains the individual who goes through this isolation and reaches a meaningful and sharable conduct in a creative way. After discussing Dewey's faith in intelligence, we will turn to the Chinese Confucianist philosopher Liang Shuming, a contemporary of Dewey's, to help explicate this question.
John Dewey: Faith in Social Intelligence
In Dewey's view, intelligence develops in the life course of unifying thinking and doing with purposes to solve genuine problems of the individual and society. To understand the self is to be conscious of the purposes and consequences of thought and action, to evaluate the capacity of the self in dealing with problems identified. For him, it is clear that knowledge is not only facts and ideas external to the person's mind. It is the capacity to connect facts and ideas with the current situation in which the person is fully engaged. Individuality has no fixed characteristics but develops out of the interaction between the environment and the individual in pursuit of purposes and aims the individual identified. With this full engagement, aims cannot be assigned or merely found in events but are formed in the person's mind when he/she participates in experience. It serves the function of "liberating and directing the energies of the concrete situations in which [individuals] find themselves." 6 Though aims are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience, they are generated through imagination. 7 In Dewey's view, imagination is a key to connect thinking and doing. It is the rearrangement of the existing order of things into new orders and evolves with new objects. It organizes old things in new relations with new ends. 8 It is the unrealized thing that comes to us and stimulates our feelings and emotion to bring about its realization. It plays a key role in making continuous and interactive experience intelligent and thus useful to personal and social growth. It connects aims and reality in solving problems. However, reaching an aim does not mean a final ending. It is only a temporary achievement. The process continues, penetrating to deeper levels of meaning, "to go below the surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it." Imagination is a key to coordinating the experience of different persons as well as varied episodes in the individual's life. Therefore, intelligence is the capacity to create connections between the experience of different persons as well as varied episodes in the individual's life with the current experience. In summary, intelligence is developed and manifested in the individual's interaction with the environment in which imagination plays a crucial role in framing purposes, thus connecting thinking and doing and combining the varied elements of our experience into a richer individuality.
Dewey's faith in intelligence is eloquently displayed in A Common Faith (1934), where he argues that in our tendency to associate that level of devotion to an aim which we call religious to religions we rob human intelligence of much of its motive energy. In his view, all dogmatic religions espouse some specific set of beliefs and insist that they are in sole possession of some special and isolated channel of access to the truths they hold, thus religion as a method lacks the public character which belongs to the method of intelligence. 10 This mystical character of religion contributes to a belief in supernaturalism, in essence a pessimistic attitude toward the power of human intelligence to fully understand human experience. It constitutes a lack of faith in human intelligence as an effective intermediary between imagined ideal ends and current experience. "One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried," Dewey argues, "is that of devotion, so intense as to be religious, to intelligence as a force in social action."
11 This religious quality of devotion to "ends so inclusive that they unify the self" must be rescued from their "identification with the creeds and cults of religion" because supernaturalism "stands in the way of using the means that are in our power to make radical changes in [social] relations."
12 If men and women were motivated in their pursuit of ideal ends through the power of human intelligence with "the faith and ardor that have at times marked historic religions the consequences would be incalculable." 13 We would have, he proclaims, a "creed…..
[that] cannot be shaken."
14 It is clear then that the object of Dewey's faith is human intelligence.
This faith in the possibilities of human intelligence to mediate between the current experience of the self and thus realize the aims projected by imagination represents a projection into the future of what has already been found effective in prior experience. In fact, the self itself is a product of such experience. In Art as Experience (1934), Dewey writes:
The self is both formed and brought to consciousness through interaction with the environment. … The self is created in the creation of objects, a creation that demands active adaptation to external materials, including a modification of the self so as to utilize and thereby overcome external necessities by incorporating them in an individual vision and expression. 15 In Dewey's view, the self is created and continually recreated through the creation of objects and the ongoing adaptation to one's external environment. It is a modification of the self by overcoming external difficulties and incorporating them into an individual vision. This is exactly what Xu did in the story. Because he lives in conditions of rapid and profound social change, he may not know what he is about. But he can creatively turn the external difficulties and incorporate them into his own vision by leading a meaningful life. On the other hand, his peers give up trying to figure out their own purposes but instead kill time through a shared and structured purposelessness of game playing. In other words, when they lose the meaning of current experience and an ability to conceive purposes that are realizable through intelligence in the radically changing condition, they become vulnerable to the external imposition of purposes, to becoming the objects rather than the agents of change, a status that lies at the heart of Dewey's account of the relationship between intelligence and democracy. One might argue further, in fact, that such conditions are not extraordinary but are, rather, a common aspect of human experience: the sense of self, no matter how stable, dissipates in the end and human intelligence, no matter how powerful and successful in solving important social problems, ultimately falls short. This is the tragic aspect of human experience. However, it is not clear to us, in Dewey's thinking, what sustains human effort in these tragic circumstances where the intelligence available to the individual self, in all its particular limitations, is confounded by experience it cannot render meaningful and unable to form realizable purposes.
What, then, carries Xu across this void in intelligibility? What inspires this momentarily unintelligible act? His case offers, we believe, insight into a reconsideration of the gap between action in response to unarticulated individual purposes and socially coordinated actions that are recognized as purposeful and, hence, intelligent. The exploration of this aspect of experience may shed light on the question of what sustains the individual's strength and hope in difficulties that the individual needs to go through. We will discuss the thought of the Chinese Confucianist Liang Shuming to respond to this question. Liang's father, a senior official in the crumbling Qing Dynasty and a traditional Confucian scholar (shi) who considered the crisis of the state his own affair, could not find in Confucianist thought the intellectual and cultural resources effective for China's modernization. Turning for a time to Western utilitarianism for answers, Liang's father ultimately committed suicide in a desperate attempt to galvanize Chinese society around a path from traditional rule into the modern world, a path he was himself unable to identify. Liang came of age intellectually in this turbulent period in Chinese history in which the nation seemed to be caught in a no-man's-land between a dying socio-political tradition and a future yet to be born.
Liang's own life reflected this rupture of social and cultural continuity. Denied a Confucianist education by his father, who believed it offered little for China's future, Liang received a Western education in its stead. In his own efforts to discover a personal and political path through this period of cultural crisis, Liang careened intellectually from his father's flirtation with utilitarianism to Buddhism, contemplating, on more than one occasion, his own suicide. Liang, like China itself, appeared to be suffering through a state analogous, in some ways, to that described by the African-American scholar Orlando Paterson as "natal alienation," severed from both a past and a future that might give direction and purpose to current existence. 16 This crisis of continuity at both the existential and cultural levels-essentially an inability to frame coherent purposes from past and present experience-focused Liang's philosophical reflection on the search for the individual and social resources necessary to survive the experience, in Dewey's words, of "being without mind." That inquiry, motivated by his early experience of rapid and profound social change, led him to a revision of Confucianism subtly colored by his encounter with Deweyan pragmatism that enabled him, in his own estimation, to weather the coming crises of the Japanese invasion, the Chinese civil war, the Cultural Revolution and the rapid economic development of the post-Mao period without relapsing into the existential crisis of continuity that had accompanied his earlier experience of the broader crisis of continuity in post-Quing China. Liang, in fact, weathered these subsequent periods of socio-political turbulence not by withdrawing from social struggle but by engaging courageously in public life on behalf of the common man, even going to far as to publicly criticize Mao in the face of personal persecution and punishment. 17 What resources did Liang find in his reading of Confucianism alongside his encounter with Deweyan pragmatism that charted a safe course through the personal and social turbulence of "being without mind?" In Liang's view, the emergence of individuality from its immersion in the environment and realization of the strength of human potential requires "self-enlightenment" (zijue), a process of coming to understand our underlying nature and subordinating desires, emotions, and instincts to it in order to transfer that motive energy to the purposeful pursuit of broader social goals that are in the longer term self interest of the individual. 18 For Dewey, the transformation from the exercise of intelligence in the pursuit of individual purposes to the exercise of intelligence in the service of broader social purposes that redound to the individual's longer term self interest requires the coordination of individual purposes with others. This coordination, he argued, was best achieved in democracy as a form of "conjoint, communicated experience" that allows the freest exercise of purposeful experience and the freest communication of the consequences of experience useful to the pursuit of individual and social purposes.
19 Thus Dewey's faith in intelligence was a faith not only in its ability to direct the efficient pursuit of individual purposes, but also in its ability to discern the broader social purposes, "the inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will [ought to] respond[s] as worthy of controlling our desires and choices."
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Though Liang agreed with Dewey's account of the value of intelligence for controlling desires and choices and thus achieving a social unity that preserved, protected, and promoted the freedom of the individual, he parts with Dewey over this optimistic faith in social intelligence as the final means of its achievement. Liang agrees that rationality helps the individual to act beyond instinct so the individual can free himself from blind passion. However, Liang also cautions that intelligence as the fruit of social interaction may mislead the individual when the environment rapidly changes. 21 Therefore, Liang emphasizes the importance of "self-enlightenment" (zijue). He claims that self-enlightenment includes intelligence but moves beyond intelligence. It is not directed by influence from outside but the requirement from inside. It is the immediate impelling need of the individual, a constant and deep call from the individual's mind to create meaning. Liang argues we need to develop "self-enlightenment" as something not in conflict with but complementary to intelligence in that it provides a motivation for creative action that does not rely on clearly articulated purposes. 22 The individual will not get lost in the radically changing social context when he/she develops "self-enlightenment" and instinctively knows what to do, even though the individual may not have clearly articulated purposes.
Liang further argues that "self-enlightenment" cannot be automatically found in the individual's mind. The individual has to struggle against the habits which tend to follow social conventions and established ways of behaving and thinking. Along with Dewey, Liang admits that habit is an important factor for an individual's development, but the individual may give up discovering new possibilities if he/she lives solely by habits. 23 If he/she does so, "self-enlightenment" cannot be reached. To reach "self-enlightenment," the individual has to go through the struggle against various habits and social conventions by himself/herself. The individual may gain strength in the struggle and receive confirmation of what he/she needs to do in the present, even though he/she may not be able to immediately connect with the environment. The awareness does not necessarily define future purposes; rather it impels the person to act in the present. In Confucianism, it is the status in which the gap between mind/heart and body is closed so the individual reaches the greatest sincerity (cheng) to the self: a harmonious relationship between body and mind/heart. This sincerity will not be changed by the influence of the environment, even though the degree of sincerity still needs to be cultivated in the process of struggle the individual faces. It is not a defined and fixed status but a pure effort to follow the basic needs of the individual to continue following the call from the inside. It may not be clearly expressed in a structured purpose, but it should be the surest thing the individual carries every minute of his/her life.
However, "self-enlightenment" does not mean that the individual can reach the wholeness of the self only by being sincere to the self. Same as Deweyan pragmatism, it emphasizes the inter-personal relationship and relationship with the environment. It neither advocates individualism nor collectivism. Instead, if the individual achieves "selfenlightenment," he/she can connect with the environment and others without difficulties. This connectedness provides intrinsic resource for the individual to creatively turn his/her inner intention to action and overcome the external barriers. In this way, the individual will not lose his/her vision of action in his/her association with the environment.
24
In the story of Xu, Liang's conception of "self-enlightenment" is helpful for us to understand Xu's conduct: his creative meaning-making by building a road in a desert area. In the story, Xu's demand to lead a meaningful life is so deep and urgent that he can ignore all the practical difficulties, including the isolation and discrimination from his peers. At this point, we can say that he moves beyond shared experience and intelligence in Dewey's view. For this period, his own purposes are uncommunicable. It is not understood by others, but it is motivated from his own intrinsic needs. His sincerity to his own needs makes him ignore the barriers from outside. To some extent, once he identifies his intrinsic problem on living a meaningful life-though this process of problem identification is definitely a social experience-he lives in and through the isolation to solve his problem. As Liang suggests, this is the process of struggle the individual has to go through by himself/herself so the individual can develop "self-enlightenment" which is beyond the simple problem-solving from outside. Then, the individual as an agent of social change can be possible. Dewey also emphasizes solving genuine problems from the individual's own experience. But he is silent on what sustains the individual going through the struggles before the individual re-gains the social connection and communication. A simple faith in intelligence is not sufficient. But Dewey seems to take this faith for granted, though in some of his late works, he admits that this faith is only an ideal. 25 It is the sincerity to lead a meaningful life without being devoured by radical social change that sustains Xu to go through the difficulties and create the meaning of his life. He sticks to his efforts to lead a meaningful life. Like Walt Whitman's "noiseless patient spider," he continues to spin out the web of his road to nowhere in the uncertain but faithful hope that his lonely effort to make meaning out of meaningless will one day be consummated in communication, in communion, in a recovery of shared meaning with others. 26 His struggle is initially a private experience that he has to handle by himself. Even though the isolation or discrimination from his peers is a kind of interaction he gets in this process, his purpose has not been shared and recognized yet at this point. It is not until he created the road as the medium of communication that his purpose is extended in a more inclusive and social way so that it is possible for others to share.
Liang's articulation of "self-enlightenment" clearly suggests an insistence that the struggle against habits and social conventions through the cultivation of sincerity is an essential step to the framing of genuine purposes. This requires, in Maxine Greene's words, an effort to stay "wide-awake" to the organic environment the individual lives in. According to Greene, this "wide-awakeness" may "take the form of anxiety, the strange and wordless anxiety that occurs when individuals feel they are not acting on their freedom, not realizing possibility, not elevating their lives. Or [it]… may accompany a sudden perception of the insufficiencies in ordinary life, or inequities and injustices in the world, of oppression and brutality and control." Without this feeling, we live in indifference, "a lack of care and an absence of concern." 27 Even though this wide-awakeness brings suffering from our recognition of the difficulties of the task and our insufficiency in the face of them; we can not construct our own intrinsic purposes and our own mind without undergoing this suffering. With this recognition of our existential predicament, the fundamental problem we are confronted with is to create meaning through our action.
It is this recognition that enables Xu to negotiate the paralysis of intelligibility characteristic of rapid and profound social change. This void, this tear in the fabric of intelligibility, which emerges in the rupture between present experience and future purposes represents a crisis in which intelligence alone, as Dewey conceives it, seems insufficient. Xu, and Whitman's spider, act not out of clearly conceived and socially shared purposes but out of something deeper, out of the nature of what they are. Spiders spin webs. Human beings make meaning. In flinging his web across space or building his road to nowhere both the spider and Xu are imposing structure on the void, thus making purposes and intelligibility and the emergence of the mind of the self possible. The unshared private struggle Xu experienced is a crucial step to reach this genuine individuality Dewey advocates. In Dewey's view, the self is created and transformed in the continu-ous, purposeful interaction with the environment. Liang agrees that the process from which our mind emerges does include interaction with the environment. But Dewey's method of intelligence alone may not enable us to achieve this sense of genuine individuality without this precondition of self-enlightenment, this meaning-making action. We may need "selfenlightenment" to gain the faith in intelligence which Dewey assumes.
Intelligence facilitates the realization of the self. But intelligence alone may not be sufficient to help the trapped and isolated accidental self, in circumstances of rapid and profound social change, develop into unique individuality in a continuous way: flinging webs and roads across the void to make it meaningful.
It is only when we recognize our real challenge-imposing meaning on the void-that we reveal the authenticity of our human nature and overcome the isolations we produce in social life by our individual desires, emotions, and instincts and close the gap between the self and the changing environment. Liang admitted that Dewey's method of intelligence almost closed this gap, but Dewey's faith in an intelligence conceived as a quality of the actions linking present conditions to clearly articulated purposes obscures the precondition of faith in the creative possibility of making meaning in conditions of apparent meaninglessness such as those encountered in the experience of rapid social change or the tragic. The prior condition of "self-enlightenment," not just intelligence or conscious knowledge enables the fullest flowering of human nature. A richer individuality can be developed as a result of this self-enlightenment.
Conclusion
We conclude, therefore, that Dewey's faith in intelligence is necessary to the achievement of a social order that promotes and preserves individual freedom in social solidarity. It is, however, insufficient to sustain the transition from individual interest to social solidarity in those circumstances, so common as to be perhaps tragically inevitable, when the clash of competing interests in the context of rapid social change, make that transition profoundly turbulent and doubtful. Dewey and Liang shared the insight of a process of transformation from the isolated and separated individual to a democratic society. And Liang recognized the transition of the individualized intelligence to cooperative unity and solidarity with others which Dewey defined as democracy. However, their difference lies in the different ways they envision individual intelligence transitioning to a broader unity with others. Liang does not have faith in intelligence as sufficient to bring this communicative experience about. He believed that a unity of the self and the changing environment has to reach the deepest feeling in human experience, which is beyond intelligence. He devoted all his efforts to discover this true feeling-sincerity-as a way of liberating individuals from the conflicts and discontinuity of turbulent environments. In an interview with his Western biographer Guy Alitto in 1980, he expressed his faith in this deepest feeling of human nature by claiming that "man has a future." 28 Liang kept this faith in self-enlightenment. Liang's account seems to reflect a greater awareness-perhaps a result of personal experience-of the tragic dimensions of those difficulties as they are actually lived by individuals and societies undergoing radical change and thus enables him to offer a more useful, though no less hopeful, resource for navigating such changes than Dewey's method of intelligence.
In arguing this point we have merely, as Dewey said philosophy of education should, attempted to analyze a problem and only begun to articulate something that might be tried. There are obvious questions that follow: What would an education that addresses this capacity for self-enlightenment look like? How would it be similar to or different from education as commonly practiced or a Deweyan approach to education? Is it primarily relevant to conditions of rapid and profound social change or all social conditions? These questions must await, however, further inquiry.
